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Abstract: This paper takes into account the dynamic feedback between government 
expenditures and output in a model that separates the effects of expected and unexpected 
government expenditures on output. We allow for standard determinants based on Solow’s 
growth model, as well as financial globalization and trade openness measures for a sample 
of 56 industrial and emerging market economies over the 1970-2004 period. We find that 
unanticipated government expenditures have negative and significant effects on output 
growth, with higher effects in developed economies. Along with savings responses, we 
interpret these results based on how fiscal policy reacts to business cycles. Anticipated 
government expenditures have negative - but smaller effects - on output growth. These 
results are very robust to a recursive treatment of expectations, which reinforces the role of 
new information in an increasingly integrated world economy. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper estimates a rational expectations model in the tradition of Barro (1977) to 
separate the effects of expected and unexpected government expenditures on output. We conduct 
a new econometric treatment of output growth over the years 1970-2004, which provides a fairly 
long time span of analysis. Our approach is initially based on the literature on growth empirics 
that use dynamic panels (e.g., Islam, 1995). We then propose a two-step approach consistent 
with the feedback mechanism in Bun and Kiviet (2006) where in the first step we identify the 
expected and unexpected components of government expenditures and then test if they have the 
same effect on output growth. 
A reconsideration of how government size has an impact on economic growth is well 
deserved for several reasons. First, it is at the forefront of economic policy debate, including the 
way the U.S., for example, chose to fight the 2008-2009 economic crisis with expansionary fiscal 
policies (mostly through higher government deficits), coupled with loose monetary policy 
(driving the federal funds target rate to zero). Economists diverge on the effectiveness of these 
measures and the debate is ongoing. Fiscal policy is one area of attention, which under the 
Keynesian view argues for a sufficiently large multiplier effect of government purchases.  
While U.S. government calculations suggested a fiscal policy multiplier greater than one, 
Robert Barro strongly criticizes the use of a number around 1.5, stating that there are reasons to 
believe that the war-based 0.8 multiplier substantially overstates the multiplier that applies to 
peacetime government purchases.1 Robert Barro also reports the estimation of a spending 
                                                 
1
 Robert Barro, Government Spending is no Free Lunch, The Wall Street Journal, Jan 22, 2009. He makes the 
expectations channel clear: “There are reasons to believe that the war-based multiplier of 0.8 substantially overstates 
the multiplier that applies to peacetime government purchases. For one thing, people would expect the added 
wartime outlays to be partly temporary (so that consumer demand would not fall a lot). Second, the use of the 
military draft in wartime has a direct, coercive effect on total employment. Finally, the U.S. economy was already 
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multiplier of around 0.4 within the same year and about 0.6 over two years.2 Barro and Redlick 
(2011) provide detailed evidence for the U.S. economy in the long-run. Ramey (2011) surveys 
the evidence on the government multiplier. She discusses the multiplier in the neoclassical model 
as positive or negative (depending on the extent of distortionary taxes), as well as the Keynesian 
case through the marginal propensity to consume. Since theoretical work gives a wide range of 
values for the multiplier, she advocates a “turn to the data to see if we can narrow the range.” 
Ramey (2011, p. 676). 
Research on other major economies illustrates mixed findings as well. Forni et al. (2009), 
for example, employ a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model and find for the Euro area 
that government purchases of goods and services and compensations for public employees have 
small and short-lived expansionary effects on private consumption, while innovations in transfers 
to households show a slightly more sizeable and lasting effect. Afonso and Jalles (2011) report 
panel results for 108 countries from 1970-2008 using a growth model in which the results show a 
negative effect of government size on growth. For the European Union, in particular, member 
states faced a fiscal framework with sound fiscal policies within the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) guidelines put forward in 1997. They use three indices constructed by the European 
Commission (overall rule, expenditure, and budget balance indexes) based on surveys and find 
that these fiscal numerical rules improve GDP growth for these EU countries, while the 
government size proxy loses significance. 
Second, it is clear that the size of government matters for growth, although the precise 
effect is difficult to determine. The positive effect of government activities on output depends in 
                                                                                                                                                             
growing rapidly after 1933 (aside from the 1938 recession), and it is probably unfair to ascribe all of the rapid GDP 
growth from 1941 to 1945 to the added military outlays. In any event, when I attempted to estimate directly the 
multiplier associated with peacetime government purchases, I got a number insignificantly different from zero.” 
2
 Robert Barro, The Stimulus Evidence One Year On, The Wall Street Journal, Feb 23, 2010. 
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theory on the relative efficiency of the public sector. Perhaps the best well known paper is Barro 
(1990), who extends endogenous-growth models to include tax-financed government services on 
production and assumes exogenous government actions. In his model variations in the share of 
productive government expenditures in GDP affect the growth and saving rates. Kneller et al. 
(1999) find strong empirical support for Barro (1990)’s endogenous growth model, in which 
taxation and public expenditure can affect the steady-state growth rate. Growth regressions in 
Mueller and Stratmann (2003) from 1960 to 1990 show that there is a positive association 
between government size and growth in low-income countries, where the government sectors 
tend to be small, and a negative relationship across high-income countries, where government 
sector has grown larger. Tagkalakis (2008) examines the effects of fiscal policy on consumption 
in recessions and expansions in a yearly panel of nineteen OECD countries from 1970 to 2002 
and finds that the effect of fiscal policy is more pronounced in countries characterized by a less 
developed consumer credit market. His explanation is through binding liquidity constraints. 
Barro (1991) and López-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011) find that the share of 
government consumption in GDP is inversely related to GDP growth, while Levine and Renelt 
(1992) report government consumption expenditures to GDP having a negative effect on GDP 
growth, but the results are not robust. A host of papers has assessed the role of government 
expenditures on growth. Different specifications include removing education and defense from 
government expenditures in Barro (1990) but most previous works in the cross-section tradition 
have demonstrated the fragile nature of the link between government expenditures on growth.3 
                                                 
3
 In time series, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) examine the effects of changes in government spending and taxes on 
output. Employing a three-variable VAR (with taxes, spending, and quarterly real per capita GDP) for the postwar 
U.S., they find in all specifications that output responds positively to a spending shock, although the persistence of 
the impulse responses changes depending on whether a deterministic or stochastic trend is assumed. 
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Ram (1986) surveys the earlier evidence on the size of government and economic growth. 
Bergh and Henrekson (2011) survey the more recent literature and report a significant negative 
correlation in most recent studies: an increase in government size by 10% is associated with a 
0.5% to 1% lower annual growth rate. One of the problems that plagued earlier works is the 
possibility of reverse causation, in which the extent of economic growth could determine the size 
of government. As Bergh and Henrekson (2011, p. 12) put it: “In general, in times of economic 
downturn social expenditure provides stabilizers that automatically undermine the government’s 
balanced budget. On the other hand, in boom years when growth rates are higher fewer people 
will be unemployed, and public expenditure shares will be lower. For this reason, a negative 
correlation between public expenditure and economic growth is to be expected in the short run. 
Finding a negative correlation is therefore no proof that high expenditure causes low growth.” 
Third, previous research on economic growth has outlined how productivity is enhanced 
by the extent of trade openness and/or integration to global capital markets. Edwards (1998) 
examines nine measures of trade policy in 93 countries on total factor productivity growth and 
found that more open countries experienced faster productivity growth. Edison et al. (2002) 
report estimations of international financial integration effects on economic growth per capita for 
57 countries. Although they usually find positive growth effects on the capital flows measure, 
they show mixed results for government balances. For Mishkin (2009) opening to foreign capital 
directly increases access to capital, lowering its cost. See also the dynamic panels by Chang et al. 
(2008) and Baltagi et al. (2009). Aizenman (2008) links financial with trade openness and 
documents highly significant positive association between changes in financial and trade 
openness in developing countries and Swaleheen (2011) relates the extent of the size of 
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government with economic growth and shows a negative effect of corruption on the growth rate 
of real per capita income.4 
Fourth, most of the existing empirical estimates have assumed that government 
expenditures are entirely exogenous to economic growth. We relax this assumption in this paper, 
exploring the class of estimators developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). Endogeneity has 
plagued past research on economic growth and Barro (1990, p. S121) mentions in a theoretical 
paper that “aside from problems of measuring public services and the rates of growth and saving, 
the empirical implementation of the model is complicated by the endogeneity of government.” 
Perotti (1999) assumes exogenous government expenditures in his treatment of private 
consumption responding to fiscal shocks and to the state of the economy. 
In this paper we reexamine the role of anticipated and unanticipated government 
purchases in economic growth. With the Solow (1956) model as benchmark, the rate of 
population growth and the ratio of investment to output are the key determinants of economic 
growth. Capital flows from abroad and government expenditures can, however, provide 
additional channels to economic growth, as long as these affect the stock of capital and the 
savings rate, respectively. Recent research along these lines by Mollick and Cabral (2011) and 
Cabral and Mollick (2012) sheds light on this channel for a sample of developed and emerging 
market economies from 1986 to 2004 to capture the globalization years after GATT negotiations 
in late 1980s. 
We find that unanticipated government expenditures have negative and significant effects 
on output growth. Anticipated government expenditures have negative - but almost negligible 
                                                 
4
 The link between government size and openness has been extensively studied as well. Rodrik (1998) finds a 
positive relationship between trade openness and the size of government, and Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) 
document a negative covariation of country size with trade openness and with the ratio of government expenditures 
to output. Ram (2009) uses 41-year panel data covering the period 1960-2000 for 154 countries to find support for 
the direct relationship in Rodrik (1998), while Benarroch and Pandey (2008) find the opposite to Rodrik (1998). 
7 
 
effects - on output growth. We also find that, in developed economies, the unanticipated output 
effects of government expenditures are much higher than in emerging markets. These results are 
very robust to a recursive treatment of expectations. 
In contrast to Tagkalakis (2008), who used as proxy for credit constraints the maximum 
ratio of the loan to the value of the house in housing mortgages for first time buyers in OECD 
economies, we verify the role of credit constrains distinguishing between developed and 
emerging market economies as did Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2007): economies can be more or 
less open depending on the extent of financial (and trade) flows. This may complement the 
government-output channel in fiscal policy. It is natural to expect that developed and developing 
countries may have different causal mechanisms when exploring economic growth when both 
external flows and the government sector are present. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) use a 
calibrated neoclassical growth model and found that developing countries do not benefit greatly 
from international financial integration and Adam and Bevan (2005) report threshold effects of 
fiscal deficits on growth for a panel of 45 developing countries. 
This paper has four more sections. Section 2 introduces the data employed in this work; 
section 3 contains the empirical methodologies and the dynamic panel data models used; section 
4 discusses the results; and section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Data 
The data set for this paper comes from a yearly panel including 56 countries for over 35 
years, from 1970 to 2004. Cabral and Mollick (2012) contain more detailed discussion of this 
dataset. The main source of data is the World Bank Development Indicators database and the 
data set on foreign assets compiled by Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2007). The variables in the data 
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set are the Gross Domestic Product  for country  at year , total population , government 
expenditures , investment , and three measures of globalization. The first is trade openness 
	
, calculated as the sum of imports and exports, divided by . The second and third 
measures follow Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2007). The second is international financial integration 
, calculated as the stock of external assets plus the stock of external liabilities, divided by 
. The third is a financial integration measure based on portfolio equity and Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) stocks. It is calculated as the stock of portfolio equity assets plus the stock of 
portfolio equity liabilities plus the stock of direct investment assets plus the stock of direct 
investment liabilities, all divided by . Openness measures vary considerably across countries: 
they are much higher for industrial economies if measured by capital flows and are about the 
same for emerging markets if measured by trade considerations. 
[Table 1 here] 
The correlation coefficients between our three measures of globalization and the output 
per worker are mostly positive and on average larger for industrial economies. These are not 
shown in the table but can be summarized. There are weak negative correlations between / 
and output growth, varying from -0.08 in emerging markets to -0.15 in industrial economies. 
Correlation between / and / is negative in industrial economies (-0.43) supportive of a 
large crowding-out and very weak (-0.02) for emerging markets. Finally, correlation coefficients 
between / and our measures of openness are negative in industrial economies (except for 0.19 
with 	
) and close to zero throughout for emerging markets. 
The within-countries sample averages of the main variables are presented in Table 1, in 
which we divide the sample between developed and emerging economies according to the 
classification in Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2007). The figures presented in the table are country 
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level sample averages of GDP per capita (/), rate of population growth (Δ/), 
government expenditures to GDP (/), and expected government expenditures to GDP 
([/]) based on recursive estimation as explained below. Three differences can be easily 
derived from this table. Developed economies have a nearly six time larger GDP per capita, 
emerging economies have about three times larger population growth rate, and government 
expenditures to GDP is about 44% larger in developed economies (/ average ratios of 18.88 
versus 13.10). In order to keep the tradition of long-run growth regressions in Mankiw et al. 
(1992), the series are not filtered. We decompose, however, government size into expected and 
unexpected components, thus adding misperceptions to growth determinants. 
 
3. Empirical Methodology 
Under the small open economy assumption, Abel et al. (2011) show that desired savings 
(Sd) and investment (Id) depend positively and negatively, respectively, on the world real interest 
rate (rw). If G goes up, savings (S = Y – C – G) decrease and the saving function decreases, 
shifting to the left. For a given rw, current account (CA) incurs a deficit, which can be offset by 
either higher trade surplus (TB) or higher capital account (KA) surplus. The financial 
globalization measures used in this paper take this offsetting factor of CA into account when 
government undertakes higher or lower deficits in response to the business cycle. While Perotti 
(1999) assumes exogenous government expenditures for simplification, we believe it is more 
interesting to allow government expenditures to be endogenous (in the feedback mechanism 
specified below) and respond to all new information available. Our results hold of course with 
simpler autoregressive processes for G. 
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The basic empirical models below build on Mankiw et al. (1992)’s treatment of Solow 
(1956). In this paper we modify this framework for anticipated and unanticipated government 
expenditures in the tradition of the rational expectations model by Barro (1977), who showed 
that only unanticipated money has real effects on unemployment. In doing so, we briefly 
compare our strategy to two empirical works, who have identified unexpected government 
shocks differently. For instance, as for the identification of anticipated fiscal shocks within a 
VAR framework, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) draw two conclusions: “First, identifying and 
tracing the effects of anticipated fiscal shocks can be done within a VAR framework but requires 
stronger identification restrictions. These restrictions may be too strong. Second, under these 
identification restrictions, we find that allowing for anticipated fiscal policy does not alter 
substantially the results we have obtained so far, … , our impulse responses suggest only weak 
effects of anticipated tax changes on output, a result consistent, for example, with the findings by 
Poterba (1988) for the Reagan tax cuts.”  Blanchard and Perotti (2002, p. 1355). In the context of 
cross-section regressions over 1960-2000, Woo (2011) puts forward a fiscal policy volatility 
channel, in which excessive discretionary changes in fiscal policy take place for reasons other 
than smoothing out fluctuations or responding to macroeconomic conditions. He first estimates 
time series regressions for final government expenditures (for each country) as a function of real 
GDP and controls. The country-specific measure of discretionary spending policy volatility is the 
log of standard deviation of the residuals of this equation.  
We propose below a way to separate expected from unexpected components of 
government expenditures in a completely different fashion than these VAR and two-step OLS 
procedures to fiscal policy. Initially our estimation of the main output growth equation follows 
the literature on growth empirics that use dynamic panel data methods (see, e.g., Islam, 1995). 
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We then propose a two-step procedure where in the first step we estimate a government 
expenditures equation that follows the feedback mechanism in Bun and Kiviet (2006). This first 
step serves to separate government expenditures into its expected and unexpected components. 
In the second step we reestimate the output growth equation by allowing the marginal effects of 
government expenditures on output to be different if the expenditures are expected or if they are 
shocks. 
  
3.1. Output Dynamics 
The dynamic specification that captures the effect government expenditures on output is 
given by: 
  = 	, +  + ′ 	+  +       (1) 
where  is the logarithm of the real output per capita in country  at time ,  is the logarithm 
of the ratio of government expenditures to GDP ( = log	(/)), and  is a vector of 
controls that contains the logarithm of the investment-to-output ratio (% = log	(/)), the 
rate of population growth (& = Δ/,), and any of our three measures of globalization 
('()& = , *, or 	
). Our measures of globalization are the logarithm of assets 
related globalization (), the logarithm of equity related globalization (*), and the 
logarithm of trade openness (	
).  is the time-invariant country-specific characteristic and  
is the remainder stochastic term. 
 Although the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is not of direct interest, 
allowing for dynamics in the underlying process may be crucial for recovering consistent 
estimates of the effect of government expenditures on output. The correlation between 
government expenditures and output may reflect a common driving force that arises from a 
12 
 
dynamic adjustment process. Hence, to take into account that government expenditures during 
period  may be affected by previous levels of output and previous output shocks, we will treat 
 first as weakly exogenous and then as endogenous in the estimation of Equation (1).5 That is, 
we allow for a dynamic feedback between government expenditures and output and obtain 
consistent estimates of the coefficient of interest by using the difference and system GMM 
estimators as proposed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and 
Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). In addition, these estimators are specifically 
designed to deal with a predetermined (or endogenous) , and the joint endogeneity of ,, 
%, and '()&. We will treat the population growth rate as exogenous. 
These estimators control for time-invariant country-specific characteristics, ηi, and 
maintaining that the disturbances are serially uncorrelated  is endogenous in the sense that it is 
correlated with  and earlier shocks, but uncorrelated with future shocks. That is, (+) = 0 
for % <  and for all , and (+) ≠ 0 for % ≥  and for all . Serially uncorrelated  means 
that the error term is an unexpected change in output and that previous unexpected changes 
cannot be used to predict future unexpected changes. Furthermore, weak exogeneity or 
endogeneity of  is consistent with rational expectations models and does not restrict agents 
from adopting a forward-looking perspective about the evolution of any of the variables in the 
model with the exception of &, of course, which is modeled as strictly exogenous. 
If the value of the lagged dependent variable is close to 1, then we would have a high 
degree of persistence. Following recent Monte Carlo results by Hauk Jr. and Wacziarg (2009) 
                                                 
5
 In an innovative approach to deal with the endogeneity of cyclicality of fiscal policy Svec and Kondo (2012) use 
the stringency of balance budget rules across U.S. states as instruments in a cross-section growth regression. While 
in their case the U.S. state level dataset extends until 2009, they limit the analysis to 1977-1997 due to changing 
variable definitions. In our dataset for countries of the world, there is a surprisingly lower level of (uniform) data 
availability for tax revenues, as can be checked at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS This 
constraint implies that tax revenues data would only be available from 1990 onwards (and not for all countries 
studied herein), which prevents us from using tax revenues in the equation for government expenditures below. 
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showing that not only fixed effect but also difference GMM estimators overstate the speed of 
convergence (in growth regressions), we report the estimates under fixed effects and system 
GMM estimators. 
 
3.2. Government Expenditures Dynamics 
The dynamic output characterization of (1) does not require specifying any models for  
to obtain estimates of the parameters (α, β, θ). However, formalizing the feedback mechanism 
from output to government purchases serves two objectives. First, it can be used to show why  
needs to be treated as weakly exogenous or endogenous in the estimation of equation (1). 
Second, characterizing the evolution of  is useful to separate expenditures into expected and 
unexpected government expenditures. Our simplest specification of the feedback mechanism 
follows one of the characterizations in Bun and Kiviet (2006) and models government 
expenditures using:6 
  = 	0, + 1, + 2′, + 	3 + 4.     (2) 
Equation (2) indicates that the government decides expenditure levels at the beginning of 
the period based on the realization of last period's variables. When 1 = 0,  in (1) is strictly 
exogenous. When 1 ≠ 0,  it should be modeled as endogenous or weakly exogenous and 
depends via , on all past disturbances; not just on . 
 As (2) suggests, government expenditures today can be affected by previous realizations 
of output. Moreover, equation (1) indicates that output can be affected by previous realizations of 
the right-hand side variables. This feedback mechanism between output and government 
expenditures means that agents can behave dynamically. Weak exogeneity or endogeneity of  
                                                 
6
 Bun and Kiviet (2006) formalize the feedback mechanism to analyze the finite sample behavior of particular least 
squares and method of moments estimators. A similar characterization is used in Blundell et al. (2000) in some 
Monte Carlo simulations. 
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only implies that government expenditure decisions today must be uncorrelated with future 
realizations of unexpected output shocks. This does not restrict the government or other agents 
from adopting a forward-looking perspective. Moreover, weak exogeneity and endogeneity are 
consistent with rational expectations models in which agents' beliefs would be equal to the true 
data-generating process. Under rational expectations, government sets expenditures according to 
equation (2), while output evolves according to (1). However, agents may have their own 
subjective beliefs about the evolution of  and , and not necessarily following (1) and (2).7 
Even if all agents have rational expectations, private information drives variance on when (and 
how much) governments spend. Notice that equation (2) can be used to assess the cyclicality of 
fiscal policy, for example, as in Woo (2011), who uses time series data to estimate the responses 
of government expenditures to real GDP. 
 
3.3.  Output and the Role of Expectations 
Equation (2) can be written to emphasize the existence of the two additive separable 
components of : 
  = 5	|,, ,, ,, 0, 1, 2, 37 + 4 .     (3) 
The first term on the right-hand side is the expected or anticipated component, while the 
second term is the unanticipated component of government expenditures. We can then rewrite 
(1) to identify the effect of each of these two components on output: 
  = 	, + 8[] + 9( − []) + ′ +  + .   (4) 
Note that (1) is a restricted version of Equation (4), where the restrictions are 8 + 9 =
 and 8 = 0. The expected evolution of , [], is obtained as the fitted values in the 
                                                 
7
 Tortorice (2012) finds that while households’ expectations can depart dramatically from VAR forecasts, 
professional forecasters’ expectations do not depart much.   
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estimation of (3), while the shock, ( − []), is obtained as the regression residuals. Note 
that because the output equation controls for time-invariant country-specific characteristics , 
we do not need estimates of the time-invariant components of the error term 3 in (3). This two-
step procedure means that [] and ( − []) are derived from a first-stage estimation of 
the government expenditures equation. Including only the fitted values on (3) would yield 
incorrect standard errors because of the additional variation that arises when estimating [].8  
It is interesting to note that Equation (1) follows the existing literature on growth 
empirics that use dynamic panels (e.g., Islam, 1995). This literature is concerned with explaining 
economic growth and it is largely motivated by the theoretical models in Solow (1956) and 
Mankiw et al. (1992). These models involve not only long-run growth but also short-run 
convergence towards steady-states. While Equation (1) is the typical economic growth equation 
with a long-run interpretation, Equation (4) also models short-term dynamics. This is the case 
because unanticipated government expenditures are, of course, short-run. Moreover, the 
intermediate step of estimating Equation (2) prior to estimation of Equation (4) can be 
interpreted as a filtering of .9 While the most common use of filters is to calculate trends or 
detrend a variable, Equation (2) 'filters'  in the sense that it separates its expected and its 
unexpected components in a model that considers forward looking agents and it is consistent 
with rational expectations. 
 
3.4.  Recursive Estimation of Expectations 
                                                 
8
 Equation (4) follows Model 4 in Pagan (1984) and accounts for the estimation error associated with the first-step 
estimation, ( − []), explicitly by including it in the estimated equation. More recent implementations of 
Model 4 in Pagan appear in Abowd et al. (1999) and Escobari (2012).  
9
 Some panel studies (e.g., Furceri and Mourougane, 2012) use the Kalman filter to obtain structural unemployment 
or univariate filters (such as the Hodrick-Prescott filter) to smooth variables. In this paper we follow Islam (1995) 
and we do not use those filters. 
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The two-step procedure just described assumes that agents know the parameters (0, 1, 2) 
when they form their expectations of . Equation (3) is estimated only once using the whole set 
of usable observations in the sample. However, even if agents know the true data-generating 
process when forming their expectations, at time  they do not know the future realizations of the 
variables that are actually being used if we estimate (0, 1, 2) only once. A more realistic 
approach is to condition the formation of expectations on the same information set agents have. 
Formally, (3) becomes 
  = 5	|Ω,7 + 4         (5) 
where 
 <, = =,+, ,+, ,+, 0+,1+, 2+, 3>    for all   % ≥ 0. (6) 
This last equation indicates that the information set at the end of period  − 1, <,, 
includes all previous realizations of the variables (including previous shocks), but does not 
include contemporaneous shocks. In addition, notice that the coefficients (0, 1, 2) are allowed 
to change over time because they are updated every period as additional new information 
becomes available. To reflect this process we construct [] and ( − []) using time-
varying (0, 1, 2), that are obtained from a recursive estimation of (5); i.e., we estimate (5) 
every period using only the observations detailed in (6). 
 
3.5.  Estimation Methodology and Assumptions 
In order to estimate equations (1), (2) (only once and recursively), and (4), we use the 
generalized-method-of-moments (GMM) estimators for dynamic panel data models proposed in 
Holtz-Eakin et at. (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell 
and Bond (1998). These estimators are consistent with rational expectations models, include 
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dynamics, and address the potential endogeneity of the regressors. To show the importance of the 
assumptions behind these estimators, consider the estimation of (2). Taking first differences 
eliminates the time-invariant country-specific characteristics: 
 ∆ = 0∆, + 1∆, + 2′∆, + ∆4.     (7) 
 We need instruments to deal with the potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables. 
By construction ∆4 is correlated with ∆,, ∆,, and ∆,. Under the assumptions that 
4 is not serially correlated and that , and , are predetermined, the difference GMM 
dynamic panel estimator uses the following moment conditions: 
 5,+∆47 = 0  for % ≥ 2;  = 3,… , 	,           (8) 
 5,+∆47 = 0  for % ≥ 2;  = 3,… , 	,      (9) 
 5,+∆47 = 0  for % ≥ 2;  = 3,… , 	.     (10) 
 Blundell and Bond (1998) point out a statistical shortcoming with this GMM difference 
estimator. If the variables are persistent over time, lagged levels of these variables are weak 
instruments for the regression equation in differences. To avoid the imprecision associated with 
this estimator, we will use the system GMM estimator as proposed in Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998). This system estimator combines the regression in differences 
with the regression in levels. The instruments of the regression in levels are the lagged values of 
∆,, ∆,, and ∆,. The validity of these instruments relies on the following additional 
assumption: The first differences of ,, ,, and , are uncorrelated with the time-
invariant country-specific effect (3), but their levels may be correlated with 3. The additional 
moment conditions for the levels equations are: 
 5Δ,(3 + 4)7 = 0   for  = 3,… , 	,        (11) 
 5Δ,(3 + 4)7 = 0   for  = 3,… , 	,       (12) 
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 5Δ,(3 + 4)7 = 0   for  = 3, … , 	.      (13)  
Therefore, the system GMM uses moment conditions (8) through (13) to obtain 
consistent and efficient estimates of (0, 1, 2).10 To address the validity of the instrument list we 
report the Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions, which tests the overall validity of the 
instruments by analyzing the sample analog of the moment conditions. Because we have a large 
number of time periods we are concerned that the Hansen test may be weakened due to the large 
instrument collection (see, e.g., Roodman, 2009a). To avoid weakening the Hansen test we 
“collapse” the instrument list as suggested in Roodman (2009b, p. 107). To test the hypothesis 
that the error term 4 is not serially correlated we test whether Δ4 is second-order serially 
correlated. This test is critical not only for the validity of one of the assumptions behind the 
estimator, but also for ( − []) in (4) to truly represent a shock. Serially uncorrelated 4 
means that ( − []) corresponds to an unexpected change in government expenditures, and 
that previous unexpected changes and previous realizations of the variables cannot be used to 
predict ( − []). 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Dynamic Output Equation 
The results from the estimation of (1) are presented in Table 2. For comparison purposes 
the first two columns report sets of estimates that assume strict exogeneity of all the right-hand 
side variables. The first column presents the Pooled OLS and the second the Within 
specification, which additionally controls for time-invariant country-specific characteristics. To 
relax the strict exogeneity assumption columns (3) and (4) present the two-step difference and 
                                                 
10
 Analogous moment conditions are used to estimate (, , ) and (, 8 , 9 , ) in equations (1) and (4), 
respectively. 
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the system GMM estimators respectively, which allow ,, ,E, to be endogenous and , 
and %, to be weakly exogenous (we continue treating the population growth & as strictly 
exogenous). The difference estimator in column (3) uses moment conditions analogous to 
equations (7), (8), and (9), while the system estimator in column (4) additionally uses moment 
conditions analogous to equations (11), (12), and (13). The validity of these specifications is 
addressed with two tests. We include the second lag of the dependent variable to help comply 
with the assumption of no serial correlation of the estimators; in subsequent tables the second lag 
is also included in the estimations for the  and  equations for the same reason. Across all 
GMM specifications we observe that the high p-values in the second-order serial correlation test 
in ∆ provide strong support for the assumption that the errors  are not serially correlated. 
Moreover, the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions to test the overall validity of the 
instruments shows that, across all specifications, the null hypothesis that the instruments are not 
correlated with the residuals is not rejected. 
Notice that while the estimates on the first lagged dependent variable are consistently 
above one, the long-run effect (which is typically the focus on convergence literature) is obtained 
by summing the coefficients on all the lags of the dependent variable. In our case the sum is in 
most cases less than one. This is a concern because if the sum is greater than one then there is a 
unit root and the difference GMM estimator will not be able to identify the coefficients on the 
lagged dependent variables because lagged values of 	would be uncorrelated with its first 
differences. This is another reason why the system GMM is our preferred estimator, where the 
identification in this case would come from the levels equations (Equations 11 to 13). 
[Table 2 here] 
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 Consistent with the Monte Carlo simulation results in Blundell et al. (2000), the estimate 
on  in the difference specification appears to be biased downwards. Blundell et al. (2000) find 
that the bias is large when the regressor is persistent, which we will see is the case for  once 
we estimate equation (2). Columns (6) through (8) consider our measures of globalization 
('()& = , *, or 	
) and focuses on the system estimator that models  and as 
potentially endogenous.11 The estimates appear robust across all specifications; the exogenous 
component of government expenditures has a negative effect on output. The point estimate in 
column (5) indicates that a 1% increase in government expenditures to GDP decreases real 
income per capita by 0.081%. The sign of this coefficient is consistent with the cross-section 
studies by Barro (1991) and with Levine and Renelt (1992), but the latter finds that the negative 
sign is not robust. The negative sign associated with  is also in line with the dynamic panels 
by Mollick and Cabral (2011) and Cabral and Mollick (2012). The estimates in Table 2 show 
that higher investment-to-output ratio leads to higher output and that the rate of population 
growth affects output negatively. According to column (5), a one percent increase in the 
investment-to-output ratio leads to an increase in real output per capita by 0.016%, while a one 
percent increase in the rate of population growth decreases real output per capita by 0.018%. 
Finally, from our measures of globalization, in columns (6) and (8) international financial 
integration and trade openness have negative effects on output. 
 
4.2. Government Expenditures 
                                                 
11
 To illustrate the difference between predetermined and endogenous consider the instrument list in the 
specification in column 4, where  and %  are treated as weakly exogenous and & is treated as strictly exogenous. 
Instruments for the first-differenced equations are ∆&, and the first and further lags of ,, , and % . The 
instruments in the levels equations are ∆,, ∆ , and ∆%. Treating  as potentially endogenous rather than 
predetermined invalidates , and ∆ as instruments. Hence, the instruments formed with  have one 
additional lag when compared to the ones based on the predetermined . 
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In order to separate the evolution of  into its expected and unexpected components 
Table 3 reports the estimates of the feedback mechanism from output to government 
expenditures discussed in Equation (2). As in the output equation, Table 3 also reports the 
Pooled OLS and the Within estimates. All the GMM specifications pass both tests: the Hansen 
test for the overall validity of the instrument list and the serial correlation test. The latter also 
validates the use of ( − []) as the unexpected component of government expenditures, 
which cannot be predicted from previous realizations of variables and shocks. In this estimation 
of Equation (2) the population growth is treated as strictly exogenous, while the lagged output 
and lagged measures of openness are treated as predetermined. This is reasonable because all are 
lagged one period and it is consistent with the government deciding  after observing 
government expenditures and the realizations of the other right-hand side variables. A 
predetermined (or weakly exogenous) , does not mean that governments are not forward 
looking. They may have their own beliefs about  and the future evolution of output, which 
under rational expectations is given by Equation (1). 
[Table 3 here] 
 The third column of Table 3 presents a simple panel second-order autoregressive model 
for  with lagged output and lagged investment-to-output ratio, while the fourth column 
additionally includes lagged population growth &,. Columns five through seven present the 
results using our different measures of openness. Columns five and six appear with a positive 
and statistically significant output effect on government expenditures. A statistically significant 
effect validates modeling  as predetermined or endogenous in the estimation of Equation (1). 
There is some evidence that population growth impacts negatively government expenditures; the 
estimate in column 6 indicates that a one percent increase in the rate of population growth 
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reduces the ratio of government expenditures to GDP by 0.004%. Our first two measures of 
globalization, assets related globalization and equity related globalization included in columns 
(5) and (6), respectively, show a negative effect of globalization on government expenditures. 
However, trade openness reported in column (7) shows a positive and statistically significant 
effect. 
 The functional form in the estimates in Table 3 follows directly from (2), which is 
consistent with the feedback mechanism in Bun and Kiviet (2006) and treats &,	as exogenous 
and the rest as predetermined. These specifications imply that government expenditures are set at 
the beginning of the period as in Tagkalakis (2008) and respond to last period's realizations of 
the right-hand side variables. An alternative assumption is to model government expenditures as 
jointly determined with the contemporaneous right-hand side variables. Different sets of 
estimates under this alternative assumption are presented in Table 4. The previous results on 
Table 3 hold but now all globalization measures have negative effects: a higher level of 
globalization contributes to lower government size, all else constant. 
 [Table 4 here] 
 
4.3. Output, and Expected and Unexpected Government Expenditures 
After estimating (2) we use these results to construct estimates of the expected evolution 
of government expenditures [] and unexpected government expenditures ( − []). 
Table 5 provides the results of the estimation of (4) using two different specifications to obtain 
[] and ( − []). Columns 1 through 4 use the feedback mechanism reported in column 
7, Table 3, while columns 5 through 8 use the specification in column 7, Table 4. All of the 
columns in Table 5 pass both specification tests, the instrument lists are validated using the 
23 
 
Hansen test, while the serial correlation test in the difference equation shows strong evidence 
that the errors are not second-order serially correlated. The results show that when separating the 
effect of  on output in two (expected 	and unexpected ) the latter has a much larger 
negative effect on output. The effect of expected  has about half the magnitude and it is 
negative in the first four columns and positive or not statistically significant in the last four 
columns. Column 1 indicates that a one percent unexpected increase in  decreases output by 
0.072%, while a one percent expected increase in  decreases output by 0.034%. When 
additionally controlling for openness, the magnitude of the coefficients is about the same. The 
last row in Table 5 reports the p-values for the test of the null hypothesis that the effects of 
expected and unexpected  on output are the same. The p-values of zero across all 
specifications provide strong evidence against the null. The rest of the estimates in this table are 
largely consistent with the ones in Table 2, the ratio of investment to output has a positive effect 
and the population growth has a negative effect. Moreover, equity related globalization has a 
significant positive effect and trade openness has a negative effect.      
[Table 5 here] 
 To account for the possibility that economic agents may update their expectations 
formations in the form of the data-generating-process of  over time as more information 
becomes available, we estimate the coefficients (0, 1, 2) to obtain estimates of [] and 
( − []) recursively as specified in equations (5) and (6). When implementing this more 
realistic estimation strategy we assume that the econometrician has the same information set as 
the agents when they form their expectations. In particular, we first estimate equation (2) using 
data available only from 1970 to 1975. Once we estimate the coefficients (0FG, 1FG, 2FG) we use 
them to separate next period ,FH into [,FH] and (,FH − [,FH]). When an additional period 
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of data becomes available we estimate (0FH, 1FH, 2FH) using the observations from 1970 to 1976 
and then obtain [,FF] and (,FF − [,FF]). We repeat this iterative process until the data are 
exhausted, so we have sequences I[]J and I − []J that go from 1976 through 2004 for 
every country  in the sample. 
[Table 6 here] 
Table 6 reports estimates of Equation 4 when [,] and (, − [,]) are obtained 
recursively using the process just described. The results are very similar to the ones in Table 5. 
All columns pass both specification tests and both components of  have a negative and 
statistically significant effect on output. Moreover, the p-values in the last row indicate that the 
unexpected component of  has a significantly larger effect on output than the expected 
component of .  
The estimates in column 1, for example, indicate that the magnitude of the effect is about 
40% larger when the expenditures are unexpected than when they are expected. A 1% 
unexpected increase in  decreases output by 0.111%. Comparing the magnitude of the 
coefficients in Tables 5 and 6 we can observe that the recursive treatment of expectations 
increases slightly the magnitude of the unexpected components in columns (1) to (4), while the 
expected component has now a negative and statistically significant effect across all 
specifications. The rest of the coefficients have the expected signs and are consistent with 
previous results, including the globalization measures. 
 An additional set of estimates is reported in Table 7, where the goal is to test for 
differences in the effects of unexpected  on output between developed (22 economies) and 
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emerging markets (34 economies).12 The key result obtained previously holds: unexpected  
has a negative and larger effect on output than expected . Moreover, the negative effect of 
unexpected  appears to be much larger for developed economics; however, this result is not 
robust to different specifications of the government equation. The indicator variable K8L is equal 
to one if the country is developed and equal to zero otherwise. Hence, the coefficient on the 
interaction term ( − []) × K8L captures the differential effect of the unexpected  on 
output. The estimates in column 5, for example, indicate that an unexpected one percent increase 
in  leads to a decrease in output in emerging economies by 0.055%, but to a much larger 
decrease in developed economies, 0.213% (adding the coefficients of -0.055 and -0.158). 
[Table 7 here] 
 Tagkalakis (2008) found that spending shocks have more pronounced effects in bad times 
in the case of the low loan-to-value group, which is evidence for the important role that fiscal 
policy plays in periods of economic distress in less financially developed economies. In our 
estimates of Table 7 unexpected government purchases have larger negative effects for 
developed economies in columns (5) to (8). We further regress  on GDP growth and controls 
in an alternative specification to (2).13 Table 8 contains this alternative and reports GDP growth-
coefficients varying from -0.910 (with the trade openness measure) to -0.952 (with the  
measure) for industrial economies. This suggests a relatively strong countercyclical response: as 
real GDP falls, fiscal policy appears to be very expansionary (either by increases in  or by tax 
cuts) in industrial economies. The same figures for emerging markets are as follows: real GDP 
growth-coefficients varying from -0.380 (with the trade openness measure) to -0.427 (with both 
                                                 
12
 A similar test, but for the expected component of , found no difference between developed and emerging 
economies. 
13
 This can be accomplished by differencing (1) and re-estimating the equation with output growth as the dependent 
variable on lagged GDP and current government expenditures and controls. In the same way, we can regress 
government expenditures on GDP growth and controls for a variant of (2). 
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financial globalization measures). In emerging markets, the two financial globalization measures 
have a negative but small effect on /. Higher openness implies lower government size, all 
else constant. 
This modification of the feedback equation (2) to allow for real GDP growth suggests 
that fiscal policy does not respond as much to GDP growth in emerging markets, perhaps 
because of a longer lag between fiscal policy decisions and implementation by federal, state, and 
local governments in developing economies. Recent evidence along these lines, yet with an 
alternative theoretical framework than the one in this paper, is provided by Byrne et al. (2011) 
for a study on debt sustainability for 15 industrial countries from 1978 to 2005 and 27 emerging 
markets from 1990 to 2005. Byrne et al. (2011) document with system GMM the ability of 
industrial countries to go into debt when there is an economic downturn; on the other hand, 
emerging markets do not appear to be able to run deficits when there are downturns. 
[Table 8 here] 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
We model the dynamic feedback between government expenditures and output in a 
rational expectations model along the lines of Barro (1977). Allowing agents to behave 
dynamically, we find that unexpected government expenditures affect output negatively and 
expected government expenditures have negative, yet smaller, effects. The * measure of FDI 
and equity flows has a positive impact on output. When allowing agents to update their beliefs 
about the data-generating process, we find that the positive output effects of globalization remain 
with the FDI and equity measure of financial globalization. The survey by Bergh and Henrekson 
(2011) on the size of government and economic growth suggests a significant negative 
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correlation in most recent studies: an increase in government size by 10% is associated with a 
0.5% to 1% lower annual economic growth rate. The results in this paper are much closer to the 
upper range of these figures. Overall, the negative effects found herein for 56 major economies 
of the world from 1970 to 2004 are consistent with Barro (2010), who reports government 
spending multipliers substantially less than one for the U.S. experience. Ramey (2011) suggests a 
range of plausible estimates for the government multiplier in the case of a temporary increase in 
G that is deficit financed (not accompanied by an increase in taxes) to be probably from 0.8 to 
1.5. Our estimates for a panel of countries from 1970-2004 are more in line with a lower than 1 
magnitude for the multiplier. 
We also provide evidence that the negative effect of unexpected government 
expenditures on output is much larger in developed economies. While Tagkalakis (2008) 
recently proposed a liquidity constraint channel, his analysis was confined to OECD economies. 
Giavazzi et al. (2000) compare OECD countries with a larger dataset of developing economies 
and find that national savings are more responsive to government consumption in the former 
(coefficient of -0.735) than in the latter (-0.493). Byrne et al. (2011) have also recently suggested 
by system GMM the ability of industrial countries to go into debt when there is an economic 
downturn; on the other hand, emerging markets do not appear to be able to run deficits when 
there are downturns in the economy. Svec and Kondo (2012) find across U.S. states that a more 
counter-cyclical primary deficit increases state’s long-run average growth rate per capita. 
Together with the sensitivity of savings, our most likely explanation is that government 
expenditures respond differently across the two groups of countries to the business cycles: as real 
GDP falls, fiscal policy is found to be expansionary in industrial economies. The same figures 
for emerging markets are much smaller, perhaps because of longer lags associated with fiscal 
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policy actions. We take our results as evidence that fiscal policy does not respond as much to 
GDP growth in emerging markets. 
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Table 1: Sample Averages 
Developed Economies Emerging Economies 
COUNTRY / ∆/ / (%) [/] (%) COUNTRY / / / (%) [/] (%) 
Australia 16436.6 1.42 17.75 17.45 Argentina 6966.3 1.39 10.13 10.81 
Austria 18318.6 0.29 18.22 18.04 Bangladesh 264.81 2.30 4.88 5.40 
Belgium 17530.5 0.23 21.44 20.35 Brazil 3293.74 1.93 14.30 14.37 
Canada 18577.8 1.20 21.12 20.14 Bulgaria 1582.97 -0.23 16.53 16.32 
Denmark 23238.0 0.28 25.15 23.59 Chile 3225.92 1.54 12.58 12.88 
Finland 17809.0 0.35 20.05 19.61 China 459.74 1.39 13.17 14.72 
France 17829.9 0.53 21.80 20.89 Colombia 2041.71 1.88 12.40 12.59 
Germany 17964.2 0.19 19.75 19.33 Costa Rica 3241.23 2.50 14.11 14.04 
Greece 9770.5 0.66 14.53 14.76 Czech Republic 5324.48 0.11 21.63 20.78 
Iceland 24298.7 1.04 19.72 19.26 Dominican Republic 1968.28 2.10 6.88 7.56 
Ireland 14448.1 0.94 17.26 16.81 Ecuador 1281.57 2.29 13.39 13.44 
Italy 14954.1 0.24 18.18 18.06 Egypt, Arab Rep. 1028.61 2.22 16.13 15.66 
Japan 28898.5 0.61 14.46 14.80 El Salvador 1898.22 1.44 11.50 12.00 
Netherlands 18170.4 0.67 23.16 21.70 Hungary 3902.84 -0.05 10.50 11.29 
New Zealand 11465.4 1.08 18.07 17.62 India 312.68 2.01 10.88 11.54 
Norway 26914.4 0.50 20.10 19.65 Indonesia 559.3 1.83 8.78 9.56 
Portugal 7744.5 0.41 15.31 15.41 Israel 14803.29 2.46 32.83 28.77 
Spain 10646.7 0.70 15.17 15.43 Korea, Rep. 6405.68 1.23 11.44 12.18 
Sweden 22051.8 0.35 26.64 24.75 Malaysia 2594.99 2.48 14.12 14.04 
Switzerland 30465.7 0.53 10.70 11.21 Mexico 4924.76 2.10 9.94 10.53 
United Kingdom 18798.5 0.22 20.36 19.44 Morocco 1126.41 2.05 16.83 16.39 
United States 26539.2 1.05 16.51 16.32 Nigeria 382.1 2.76 7.93 8.52 
Average 18766.9 0.61 18.88 18.39 Pakistan 416.95 2.71 11.43 11.94 
Panama 3341.96 2.21 16.76 16.13 
Peru 2066.59 2.18 10.46 10.81 
Notes: The sample is from 1970 to 2004.  [/]	is based on the 
recursive estimation of  = 	0, + 1, + 2&, +
2E*, + 	3 + 4. 
Philippines 903.02 2.46 10.17 10.57 
Poland 3852.66 0.46 15.85 18.33 
Singapore 13543.88 2.04 10.69 10.99 
South Africa 3179.84 2.18 17.22 16.83 
Thailand 1262.98 1.69 11.02 11.58 
Tunisia 1506.13 1.94 15.90 15.62 
Turkey 3088.42 1.97 10.88 11.36 
Uruguay 5624.05 0.48 12.98 13.26 
Venezuela, RB 5355.87 2.64 11.01 11.19 
Average 3286.235 1.79 13.10 13.29 
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Table 2: Output Equation 
 treated as: Strictly exogenous  Weakly exogenous  Endogenous 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Pooled Within  Dif Sys  Sys Sys Sys Sys 
           
yO,P 1.296*** 1.217***  1.363*** 1.429***  1.291*** 1.341*** 1.302*** 1.297*** 
 (0.0423) (0.0480)  (0.0177) (0.0157)  (0.0133) (0.0170) (0.0176) (0.0124) 
yO,PE -0.299*** -0.233***  -0.387*** -0.459***  -0.276*** -0.317*** -0.285*** -0.276*** 
 (0.0422) (0.0468)  (0.0174) (0.0162)  (0.0125) (0.0151) (0.0158) (0.0112) 
gOP -0.00406 -0.0284***  -0.107*** -0.0431***  -0.0807*** -0.0915*** -0.0851*** -0.0929*** 
 (0.00410) (0.00949)  (0.00652) (0.00306)  (0.00255) (0.00336) (0.00289) (0.00365) 
sOP 0.0225*** 0.0171***  -0.0522*** 0.0166***  0.0157*** 0.00839** 0.0164*** 0.0182*** 
 (0.00498) (0.00612)  (0.00698) (0.00291)  (0.00287) (0.00381) (0.00352) (0.00198) 
nOP -0.00499*** -0.00847***  -0.0145*** -0.0214***  -0.0182*** -0.0208*** -0.0205*** -0.0203*** 
 (0.00160) (0.00177)  (0.000854) (0.00118)  (0.000934) (0.00108) (0.00106) (0.00109) 
        -0.00758***   
        (0.00145)   
*         -0.000200  
         (0.000963)  
TOOP          -0.0144*** 
          (0.00237) 
           
Observations 1765 1765  1708 1765  1765 1736 1730 1757 
Instruments    47 52  52 53 53 53 
Serial correlation    -0.654 -0.549  -1.331 -1.202 -1.332 -1.341 
Serial correlation (p-value)a    0.513 0.583  0.183 0.229 0.183 0.180 
Hansen    51.65 53.74  53.25 53.34 52.96 52.60 
Hansen (p-value)b    0.146 0.202  0.215 0.213 0.223 0.234 
           
Notes: The dependent variable is  . Figures in parentheses are standard errors of the GMM two-step estimates. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. a The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation (valid 
specification). b The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals (valid specification). 
35 
 
Table 3: Government Expenditures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Pooled Within Sys Sys Sys Sys Sys 
        
gO,P 0.980*** 0.896*** 0.902*** 0.903*** 0.873*** 0.857*** 0.945*** 
 (0.0606) (0.0621) (0.00439) (0.00656) (0.00908) (0.00642) (0.00544) 
gO,PE -0.0186 -0.0537 -0.0453*** -0.0455*** -0.0267*** -0.0365*** -0.0645*** 
 (0.0552) (0.0546) (0.00451) (0.00394) (0.00480) (0.00475) (0.00345) 
yO,P 0.00761*** 0.0123 0.0202*** 0.0194*** 0.0394*** 0.0528*** 0.00421 
 (0.00212) (0.00873) (0.00318) (0.00269) (0.00247) (0.00293) (0.00306) 
sO,P 0.0166* 0.0257 0.0780*** 0.0770*** 0.0513*** 0.0542*** 0.0632*** 
 (0.00947) (0.0213) (0.00279) (0.00270) (0.00357) (0.00373) (0.00343) 
nO,P    -0.000499 -0.00470 -0.00363** 0.00503 
    (0.00232) (0.00292) (0.00184) (0.00334) 
IFIO,P     -0.0230***   
     (0.00174)   
GEQO,P      -0.0190***  
      (0.00121)  
TOO,P       0.0549*** 
       (0.00473) 
        
Observations 1764 1764 1764 1764 1730 1725 1755 
Instruments   51 52 53 53 53 
Serial correlation   -1.361 -1.367 -1.408 -1.359 -1.059 
Serial correlation (p-value)a   0.173 0.172 0.159 0.174 0.290 
Hansen   55.00 54.99 54.66 53.97 55.09 
Hansen (p-value)b   0.171 0.171 0.179 0.196 0.168 
        
Notes: The dependent variable is . Figures in parentheses are standard errors of the GMM two-step estimates. * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. a The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-
order serial correlation (valid specification). b The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals (valid 
specification). 
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Table 4: Government Expenditures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Pooled Within Sys Sys Sys Sys Sys 
        
, 0.895*** 0.794*** 0.766*** 0.774*** 0.702*** 0.691*** 0.673*** 
 (0.0703) (0.0773) (0.00965) (0.0103) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0122) 
, 0.0530 0.00373 -0.0527*** -0.0486*** -0.0152*** -0.0477*** 0.0103*** 
 (0.0637) (0.0585) (0.00194) (0.00222) (0.00229) (0.001000) (0.00249) 
 0.00961*** 0.00587 0.0515*** 0.0585*** 0.0994*** 0.100*** 0.0866*** 
 (0.00352) (0.0105) (0.00420) (0.00459) (0.00439) (0.00717) (0.00489) 
%  0.0330** 0.0567** -0.0215*** -0.0200*** -0.103*** -0.0737*** 0.0150 
 (0.0130) (0.0255) (0.00626) (0.00646) (0.00882) (0.00974) (0.00954) 
&    0.0130*** 0.00705*** -0.00200 -0.0113*** 
    (0.00131) (0.00142) (0.00150) (0.00204) 
     -0.0648***   
     (0.00307)   
*      -0.0408***  
      (0.00230)  
	
       -0.142*** 
       (0.00471) 
        
Observations 1767 1767 1767 1767 1738 1732 1759 
Instruments   51 52 53 53 53 
Serial correlation   -0.864 -0.866 -1.253 -0.948 -1.442 
Serial correlation (p-value)a   0.388 0.386 0.210 0.343 0.149 
Hansen   55.29 55.34 54.91 54.65 54.82 
Hansen (p-value)b   0.164 0.163 0.173 0.179 0.175 
        
Notes: The dependent variable is . Figures in parentheses are standard errors of the GMM two-step estimates. * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. a The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-
order serial correlation (valid specification). b The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals (valid 
specification). 
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Table 5: Output Equation with Expectations 
 process:  = 	0, + 1, + 2′, + 	3 + 4   = 	0, + 1 + 2′ + 	3 + 4  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
, 1.271*** 1.307*** 1.227*** 1.263***  1.477*** 1.482*** 1.439*** 1.441*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0153) (0.0106) (0.0207)  (0.0143) (0.0135) (0.00978) (0.0189) 
,E -0.300*** -0.325*** -0.261*** -0.288***  -0.499*** -0.508*** -0.477*** -0.464*** 
 (0.0176) (0.0144) (0.00924) (0.0202)  (0.0148) (0.0136) (0.00968) (0.0191) 
[] -0.0340*** -0.0347*** -0.0132*** -0.0425***  0.0177*** 0.0295*** 0.0474*** -0.00155 
 (0.00287) (0.00372) (0.00371) (0.00364)  (0.00420) (0.00501) (0.00558) (0.00514) 
( − []) -0.0715*** -0.0761*** -0.0501*** -0.0863***  -0.0811*** -0.0759*** -0.0639*** -0.0859*** 
 (0.00370) (0.00328) (0.00286) (0.00304)  (0.00545) (0.00390) (0.00333) (0.00325) 
%  0.0360*** 0.0396*** 0.0458*** 0.0404***  0.0302*** 0.0355*** 0.0398*** 0.0337*** 
 (0.00190) (0.00310) (0.00202) (0.00211)  (0.00244) (0.00221) (0.00271) (0.00245) 
& -0.0208*** -0.0199*** -0.0189*** -0.0226***  -0.0171*** -0.0180*** -0.0175*** -0.0200*** 
 (0.00137) (0.00111) (0.000830) (0.00152)  (0.000664) (0.000765) (0.000847) (0.000994) 
  -0.000367     0.00538***   
  (0.00165)     (0.00157)   
*   0.00914***     0.00929***  
   (0.000962)     (0.000630)  
	
    -0.0221***     -0.0181*** 
    (0.00250)     (0.00212) 
          
Observations 1753 1724 1718 1753  1757 1728 1722 1757 
Instruments 52 53 53 53  52 53 53 53 
Serial correlation -1.105 -1.078 -1.221 -1.213  -0.654 -0.678 -0.687 -0.741 
Serial correlation (p-value)a 0.269 0.281 0.222 0.225  0.513 0.497 0.492 0.459 
Hansen 54.65 54.44 53.37 54.97  51.76 53.34 52.46 53.09 
Hansen (p-value)b 0.153 0.158 0.184 0.147  0.227 0.184 0.207 0.191 
H0: 8 = 9 (p-value)c 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
          
Notes: The dependent variable is  . [] and ( − []) for columns 1 through 4 are based on the estimates on column 7, Table 3, for columns 5 through 8 
are based on column 7, Table 4. Figures in parentheses are standard errors of the GMM two-step estimates. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. a The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation (valid specification). b The null 
hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals (valid specification). c The null hypothesis is that the coefficients on expected and on 
unexpected  are the same. 
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Table 6: Output Equation with Recursive Estimation of Expectations 
 process:  = 	0, + 1, + 2′, + 	3 + 4   = 	0, + 1 + 2′ + 	3 + 4 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
, 1.390*** 1.357*** 1.311*** 1.347***  1.454*** 1.373*** 1.353*** 1.396*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0126) (0.00823) (0.0112)  (0.0163) (0.0167) (0.0170) (0.0121) 
,E -0.389*** -0.367*** -0.324*** -0.346***  -0.469*** -0.387*** -0.380*** -0.410*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0117) (0.00894) (0.0116)  (0.0166) (0.0162) (0.0159) (0.0126) 
[] -0.0790*** -0.0644*** -0.0558*** -0.0816***  -0.0324*** -0.0312*** -0.00757* -0.0491*** 
 (0.00514) (0.00564) (0.00474) (0.00581)  (0.00419) (0.00418) (0.00434) (0.00531) 
( − []) -0.111*** -0.0985*** -0.0915*** -0.113***  -0.0736*** -0.0743*** -0.0551*** -0.0879*** 
 (0.00490) (0.00316) (0.00412) (0.00575)  (0.00445) (0.00545) (0.00554) (0.00653) 
%  0.0296*** 0.0388*** 0.0398*** 0.0308***  0.0244*** 0.0407*** 0.0399*** 0.0313*** 
 (0.00424) (0.00491) (0.00352) (0.00326)  (0.00219) (0.00389) (0.00268) (0.00195) 
& -0.0181*** -0.0201*** -0.0176*** -0.0165***  -0.0213*** -0.0221*** -0.0214*** -0.0231*** 
 (0.000500) (0.00124) (0.000819) (0.000925)  (0.00127) (0.00118) (0.00103) (0.00136) 
  0.00651***     0.00164   
  (0.00226)     (0.00149)   
*   0.00744***     0.00662***  
   (0.000837)     (0.000770)  
	
    -0.00400     -0.0209*** 
    (0.00374)     (0.00350) 
          
Observations 1603 1580 1574 1603  1607 1584 1578 1607 
Instruments 52 53 53 53  52 53 53 53 
Serial correlation -0.803 -0.804 -0.878 -0.961  -0.604 -0.847 -0.767 -0.849 
Serial correlation (p-value)a 0.422 0.421 0.380 0.337  0.546 0.397 0.443 0.396 
Hansen 53.31 53.01 53.41 53.45  54.26 53.94 54.59 54.13 
Hansen (p-value)b 0.185 0.193 0.182 0.182  0.162 0.170 0.155 0.165 
H0: 8 = 9 (p-value)c 1.99e-10 1.71e-09 0 2.70e-10  0 0 0 0 
          
Notes: The dependent variable is  . [] and ( − []) for columns 1 through 4 are based on the recursive estimation of  = 	0, + 1, +
2%, + 2E&, + 	3 + 4, for columns 5 through 8 are based on the recursive estimation of  = 	0, + 1 + 2% + 2E& + 	3 + 4 . Figures in 
parentheses are standard errors of the GMM two-step estimates. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. a The null hypothesis is that 
the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation (valid specification). b The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not 
correlated with the residuals (valid specification). c The null hypothesis is that the coefficients on expected and on unexpected  are the same. 
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Table 7: Output Equation with Recursive Estimation of Expectations: Developed and Emerging Economies 
 process:  = 	0, + 1, + 2′, + 	3 + 4   = 	0, + 1 + 2′ + 	3 + 4 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
, 1.387*** 1.353*** 1.316*** 1.328***  1.352*** 1.300*** 1.290*** 1.304*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0151) (0.0193) (0.0177)  (0.0161) (0.0143) (0.0161) (0.0140) 
,E -0.391*** -0.366*** -0.332*** -0.335***  -0.367*** -0.315*** -0.314*** -0.317*** 
 (0.0160) (0.0154) (0.0187) (0.0155)  (0.0161) (0.0149) (0.0158) (0.0145) 
[] -0.0627*** -0.0465*** -0.0426*** -0.0558***  -0.0322*** -0.0303*** -0.0116 -0.0454*** 
 (0.00534) (0.00384) (0.00583) (0.00592)  (0.00456) (0.00602) (0.00823) (0.00579) 
( − []) -0.104*** -0.0852*** -0.0825*** -0.0963***  -0.0553*** -0.0545*** -0.0428*** -0.0620*** 
 (0.00508) (0.00395) (0.00543) (0.00695)  (0.00521) (0.00546) (0.00688) (0.00476) 
( − []) × K8L 0.0199* 0.0150*** 0.00956 0.0196**  -0.158*** -0.159*** -0.143*** -0.196*** 
 (0.0111) (0.00554) (0.01000) (0.00834)  (0.0175) (0.0182) (0.0166) (0.0160) 
%  0.0266*** 0.0402*** 0.0401*** 0.0309***  0.0363*** 0.0487*** 0.0486*** 0.0420*** 
 (0.00462) (0.00511) (0.00487) (0.00283)  (0.00326) (0.00350) (0.00338) (0.00326) 
& -0.0176*** -0.0197*** -0.0179*** -0.0163***  -0.0196*** -0.0209*** -0.0202*** -0.0210*** 
 (0.000610) (0.000784) (0.000721) (0.000637)  (0.000872) (0.00114) (0.00110) (0.000909) 
  0.00759***     -0.000163   
  (0.000820)     (0.00155)   
*   0.00776***     0.00505***  
   (0.000688)     (0.000930)  
	
    -0.000244     -0.0171*** 
    (0.00542)     (0.00440) 
          
Observations 1603 1580 1574 1603  1607 1584 1578 1607 
Instruments 54 55 55 55  54 55 55 55 
Serial correlation -0.810 -0.820 -0.853 -1.007  -0.921 -1.098 -1.030 -1.166 
Serial correlation (p-value)a 0.418 0.412 0.393 0.314  0.357 0.272 0.303 0.243 
Hansen 52.28 54.17 54.32 52.67  54.09 54.07 54.59 54.11 
Hansen (p-value)b 0.243 0.191 0.187 0.232  0.193 0.193 0.180 0.192 
H0: 8 = 9 (p-value)c 0 0 0 0  5.24e-08 9.30e-09 0 3.02e-05 
          
Notes: The dependent variable is  . [] and ( − []) for columns 1 through 4 are based on the recursive estimation of  = 	0, + 1, +
2%, + 2E&, + 2Z*, + 	3 + 4, for columns 5 through 8 are based on the recursive estimation of  = 	0, + 1 + 2% +
2E& + 2Z* + 	3 + 4. Figures in parentheses are standard errors of the GMM two-step estimates. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. a The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation (valid specification). b 
The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals (valid specification). c The null hypothesis is that the coefficients on 
expected and on unexpected  are the same. 
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Table 8: Government Expenditures: Developed and Emerging Economies 
 process: Developed Economies  Emerging Economies 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
,  − 1  0.795*** 0.782*** 0.789*** 0.810***  0.769*** 0.736*** 0.750*** 0.731*** 
 (0.0452) (0.0460) (0.0391) (0.0309)  (0.0265) (0.0266) (0.0285) (0.0329) 
,E 0.0561 0.0487 0.0575* 0.0438  0.0693*** 0.0703*** 0.0710*** 0.120*** 
 (0.0359) (0.0421) (0.0300) (0.0283)  (0.0165) (0.0162) (0.0214) (0.0171) 
∆[\, -0.926*** -0.952*** -0.927*** -0.910***  -0.398*** -0.427*** -0.427*** -0.380*** 
 (0.0341) (0.0372) (0.0313) (0.0362)  (0.0602) (0.0602) (0.0487) (0.0569) 
%  0.0163 -0.00190 0.0105 0.0225  -0.0119 -0.0378*** -0.0294*** 0.0107 
 (0.0215) (0.0236) (0.0234) (0.0200)  (0.0109) (0.00907) (0.00650) (0.00738) 
& -0.00433*** -0.00599** -0.00365** -0.00439***  0.0106*** -0.00257 -0.00120 0.0128*** 
 (0.00147) (0.00268) (0.00175) (0.00163)  (0.00368) (0.00655) (0.00767) (0.00412) 
  -0.00282     -0.0309***   
  (0.00210)     (0.00655)   
*   -0.000717     -0.0155***  
   (0.000931)     (0.00457)  
	
    0.0116     0.0236 
    (0.00887)     (0.0170) 
          
Observations 726 725 726 726  1038 1005 999 1029 
Instruments 19 20 20 20  31 32 32 32 
Serial correlation -1.070 -1.000 -1.137 -0.955  -1.917 -1.762 -1.823 -2.013 
Serial correlation (p-
value)a 
0.285 0.318 0.255 0.339  0.0552 0.0780 0.0683 0.0441 
Hansen 16.56 16.34 16.32 17.26  32.47 31.75 31.18 32.68 
Hansen (p-value)b 0.220 0.231 0.233 0.188  0.145 0.165 0.183 0.139 
          
Notes: The dependent variable is . Figures in parentheses are standard errors of the GMM two-step estimates. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. a The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation (valid specification). b The 
null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals (valid specification). 
 
